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Abstract
This Essay will, first, provide a general discussion on the status in Union law of agreements
concluded by EU Member States. Second, brief discussions will follow on the specific nature
of agreements concluded between the Member States inter se as well as on the special status of
agreements concluded before the Member State concerned became a member of the Union. Third,
the main part of this Essay will address different categories of agreements concluded by Member
States in order to provide a more refined picture of the legal relevance of such agreements for
Union law. The final Section will provide a summary and some basic conclusions.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of European integration has made the
European Union ("EU" or "Union") an important subject of
* judge at the Court ofJustice of the European Union. The author wishes to thank
Professor Frank Benyon (European University Institute) and Dr. Henrik Ringbom
(European Maritime Safety Agency) for their observations and comments and Rachel
Harrison and Julia Pekkala (trainees at the European Court of Justice during Autumn
2010 and Spring 2011, respectively) for their assistance.
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international law and treaty-making power. And yet, the twenty-
seven EU Member States retain their state features and continue
to conclude international agreements in their own name,
sometimes with, and sometimes without, Union participation.
The overall picture is quite complex, and sometimes bewildering.
This should be seen against the general background of the
ambiguous status of the EU itself, which displays the features of
"cooperative federalism"' and "multilevel governance."2
To be sure, in the field of external relations and treaty-
making powers, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on
December 1, 2009,3 which amended the Treaty on European
Union ("TEU") 4 and replaced the Treaty Establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty")5 with the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"),6 has somewhat
simplified matters. As the European Community has disappeared
as a distinct entity, international agreements are henceforth
concluded in the name of the EU.7 The picture remains
complex, however, as not all agreements relevant to EU law are,
even after December 1, 2009, concluded by the Union alone, but
by the Union together with its Member States (so-called mixed
agreements), or by the Member States without Union adherence.
One should thus distinguish between the following three
1. See generally ROBERT SCHIJTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN LAw (2009).
2. See ALLAN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 26, 40-41, 68, 91-92, 220 (2010).
3. Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. C 306/1; seeJEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY:
A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2010).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/13
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. All references to the TEU in this Essay will be to the
TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. For the version of the TEU applicable before
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009, see Consolidated
Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/5.
5. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006
O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2010 O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU].
7. According to TEU Article 1, "[t]he Union shall replace and succeed the
European Community" while TEU Article 47 spells out that "[tihe Union "shall have
legal personality." TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, arts. 1, 47, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 16, 41. At
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, third states and international organizations
have been notified of the fact that as from December 1, 2009, the European Union
("EU" or "Union") will replace and succeed the European Community. See Council of
the European Union, Doc. No. 16654/1/09 REV 1 (Nov. 27, 2009).
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categories of international agreements: (1) agreements
concluded by the EU; (2) agreements concluded by the EU and
one or more of its Member States (mixed agreements); and (3)
agreements concluded by one or more Member States.
The first type of agreement comes into play notably in
situations of exclusive Union competence. According to TFEU
Article 3(1), the "Union shall have exclusive competence" in the
areas of, inter alia, "the conservation of marine biological
resources under the common fisheries policy" and the "common
commercial policy."8 Moreover, according to Article 3(2) TFEU,
[t]he Union shall also have exclusive competence for the
conclusion of an international agreement when its
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or
is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope.9
With respect to the latter provision, the so-called AETR-
ERTA principle (Union exclusive competence in case of
agreements that may affect common rules or alter their scope) 10 is
particularly relevant. All in all, the new competence rules of the
TEU and the TFEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, as well
as the expansion of Union legislation, will probably contribute to
a gradual broadening of the areas belonging to Union exclusive
competence."
On the other hand, the Union may authorize Member States
to conclude an agreement falling within an area of its exclusive
8. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 3(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 51.
9. Id. art. 3(2), at 51.
10. On the AETR-ERTA principle, see Commission v. Council (AETR-ERTA), Case
22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, and Opinion on Competence of the Community to Conclude
the New Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Opinion 1/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-1145.
11. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, The Future of Mixity, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE
EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 367, 371 (Cristophe Hillion & Panos
Koutrakos eds., 2010). In Commission v. Greece, Case C45/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-701,
Greece was condemned for having violated EU law by submitting to the International
Maritime Organization ("IMO") a unilateral proposal relating to two maritime
conventions binding on the Member States but not the Union. According to the Court,
the proposal could have lead to the adoption of new IMO rules that in turn-under the
AETR-ERTA principle, see supra note 10, and thus in the context of exclusive EU
competence-would affect a Union legislative act. See also Christophe Hillion, Mixity and
Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of the "Duty of Cooperation," in MIXED
AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra, at 87, 112-13.
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competence. Many examples will be given below. Suffice it to
note here that some Union legislative acts lay down a specific
procedure for such authorizations. For instance, a regulation in
2004 concerned the conclusion of air service agreements
between Member States and third countries. 12 It was adopted as a
consequence of a series of judgments of the Court of Justice of
the European Union ("Court"), which found that parts of the so-
called "Open Skies" agreements concluded by Member States
with the United States fell within the area of Union exclusive
competence." Other examples are provided by a regulation from
2009 "establishing a procedure for the negotiation and
conclusion of agreements between Member States and third
countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to
contractual and non-contractual obligations,"14 a domain
covered by the so-called Rome I and Rome II regulations,15 and a
regulation from the same year establishing a similar procedure
for such agreements concerning certain family law matters,16 in
other words matters covered by the so-called Brussels II bis
12. Parliament and Council Regulation No. 847/2004 on the Negotiation and
Implementation of Air Service Agreements between Member States and Third
Countries, 2004 O.J. L 157/7 [hereinafter Air Services Agreement Regulation]; see
FRANK S. BENYON, DIRECT INVESTMENT, NATIONAL CHAMPIONS AND EU TREATY
FREEDOMS: FROM MAASTRICHT TO LISBON 103-04 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case C-471/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9681;
Commission v. Denmark, Case C-467/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9519; Commission v.
Luxembourg, Case C-472/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9741; Commission v. Sweden, Case C-
468/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9575.
14. Parliament and Council Regulation No. 662/2009 Establishing a Procedure for
the Negotiation and Conclusion of Agreements between Member States and Third
Countries on Particular Matters Concerning the Law Applicable to Contractual and
Non-Contractual Obligations, 2009 O.J. L 200/25 [hereinafter Contractual and Non-
Contractual Obligations Regulation]; see BENYON, supra note 12, at 104.
15. Parliament and Council Regulation No. 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, 2008 O.J. L 177/6 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation];
Parliament and Council Regulation No. 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-
contractual Obligations, 2007 O.J. L 199/40 [hereinafter Rome II Regulation].
16. Council Regulation No. 664/2009 Establishing a Procedure for the Negotiation
and Conclusion of Agreements between Member States and Third Countries
Concerning Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and Decisions in
Matrimonial Matters, Matters of Parental Responsibility and Matters Relating to
Maintenance Obligations, and the Law Applicable to Matters Relating to Maintenance
Obligations, 2009 O.J. L 200/46 [hereinafter Family Law Regulation].
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regulation and a regulation relating to maintenance
obligations. 7
As far as mixed agreements are concerned (the second
category mentioned above), they are most likely to be concluded
in areas of shared competence. According to TFEU Article 4(1),
the Union shall share competence with the Member States if a
treaty confers on it a competence that does not relate to the
areas of either exclusive competence or so-called supporting
competence.18 Mixed agreements include not only a number of
bilateral agreements between the EU and its Member States, on
the one hand, and third states, on the other, but also many
multilateral conventions concerning, inter alia, environmental
matters.'9 While many multilateral conventions continue to be
closed to EU accession,2 0 there are some Council decisions,
especially in the maritime field, that contain endeavor clauses
obliging Member States to seek, "at the earliest opportunity,"
amendments to such conventions with a view to allowing the
Union to become a contracting party.21
17. Council Regulation No. 2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of
Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. L 338/1 [hereinafter Brussels II bis] (repealing
Council Regulation No. 1347/2000); Council Regulation No. 4/2009 on Jurisdiction,
Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Cooperation in Matters
Relating to Maintenance Obligations, 2009 O.J. L 7/1.
18. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 4(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 51. According to TFEU Article
6, "[t]he Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or
supplement the actions of the Member States" in some areas (such as industry, culture,
and education). Id. art. 6, at 52.
19. On the question of mixed agreements in general, see, e.g., JONI HELISKOSKI,
MIXED AGREEMENTS AS A TECHNIQUE FOR ORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES (2001); Allan Rosas, The
European Union and Mixed Agreements, in THE GENERAL LAW OF E.C. EXTERNAL
RELATIONS (Alan Dashwood & Cristophe Hillion eds., 2000); Hillion, supra note 11. For
an example of a mixed convention of considerable significance, see U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
20. See infra notes 34-35.
21. See, e.g., Council Decision No. 2004/246/EC Authorising the Member States to
Sign, Ratify or Accede to the Protocol to the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
and Authorising Austria and Luxembourg to Accede to the Underlying Instruments, art.
4, 2004 O.J. L 78/22, at 23 [hereinafter Oil Fund Convention Decision]; Council
Decision No. 2002/971/EC Authorising the Member States to Ratify or Accede to the
International Convention on the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea,
art. 5, 2002 O.J. L 337/55, at 56 (hereinafter HNS Convention Decision]; Council
Decision No. 2002/762/EC Authorising the Member States to Sign, Ratify, or Accede to
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Some mixed agreements are concluded by the EU and one
or more, but not all, Member States ("incomplete mixity"). Such
agreements may raise serious questions regarding the coverage of
the treaty relations between the EU and the third-state parties to
the agreement (for example, is the EU responsible for the
fulfillment of the agreement in those Member States that have
not adhered to the agreement in their own name?).22 More
generally, mixed agreements present a number of problems with
regard to the division of competence and responsibility between
the Union and its Member States. According to settled case law,
the duty of loyal cooperation, now expressed in TEU Article 4(3),
also applies to the area of shared competence and mixed
agreements. According to the Court, this duty flows from the
requirement of unity in the international representation of the
Union.23 In a recent case, a Member State was condemned for
having submitted a unilateral proposal to modify an annex to a
convention concluded by both the EU and its Member States,
which violated the duty of cooperation.24
Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon both
the Union institutions and its Member States.25 Such agreements,
when concluded and entered into force, become integral parts of
Union law and are directly applicable also in the Member States.
Whether they also have direct effect (i.e., they may be invoked
directly by private parties before courts and authorities) will
the Bunkers Convention, art. 5, 2002 O.J. L 256/7, at 8 [hereinafter Bunkers
Convention Decision]; see also HENRIK RINGBOM, THE EU MARITIME SAFETY POLICY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 93-95, 123-25, 136-38 (2008).
22. See, e.g., Rosas, supra note 11, at 373.
23. See Commission v. Council, Case C-25/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1469, 48; Opinion
on Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Concerning
Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property, Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267,
108; Opinion on Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organisation
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
1061, 1 36; Ruling on Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, Ruling 1/78,
[1978] E.C.R. 2151, t 34-36.
24. Commission v. Sweden, Case C-246/07, [2010] E.C.R. I (delivered Apr. 20,
2010) (not yet reported). This case concerned the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119, concluded by the EU in Council
Decision No. 2006/507/EC Concerning the Conclusion, on Behalf of the European
Community, of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2006 O.J. L
209/1; see also Commission v. Ireland, Case C-459/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4635.
25. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 216(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 144.
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depend on the nature of the agreement and the individual
provisions invoked.26 In the EU hierarchy of norms, agreements
concluded by the Union are situated between primary law (such
as the TEU and the TFEU) and legislative acts (such as
regulations and directives).27 As all norms of EU law, they have
primacy over the national laws of Member States.28 These
observations apply, in principle, to mixed agreements as well,
although it cannot be excluded that, insofar as it is possible to
distinguish between a Union part and a Member State part of a
mixed agreement, the latter part becomes more extraneous to
Union law in the strict sense.29
Agreements concluded by EU Member States but not by the
Union are even more clearly extraneous to Union law. They
form, in principle, part of the national law of the Member States
that have concluded them. As will be developed below, however,
this does not necessarily imply that such agreements are
irrelevant from a Union law perspective. While the question of
Union agreements, including mixed agreements, has been
examined quite extensively in legal literature, much less
attention has been paid to the possible relevance for Union law
of agreements concluded by the Member States.30
26. On the status and legal effects of international agreements concluded by the
EU (before December 1, 2009, also by the European Community) see, e.g., PIET
EECKHOUT, ExTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 226-344 (2004); Allan Rosas, The European Court of
justice and Public International Law, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES 71, 74-79 (Jan
Wouters et al. eds., 2008).
27. See Int'l Air Transp. Ass'n. v. Dep't. for Transp., Case C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-
403, 1 35; see also ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 2, at 42, 48.
28. On the principle of primacy, see, e.g., Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R.
585; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fdr Getreide
und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125; Consolidated Versions of the Treaty
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Declaration Concerning Primacy, 2010 O.J. C 83/01, at 344 [hereinafter 2010
Consolidated TEU & TFEU]; see also ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 2, at 55-59.
29. See, e.g., Merck Gendricos-Produtos Farmaceuticos v. Merck, Case C-431/05,
[2007] E.C.R. 1-7001 (declining to answer a question concerning the possible direct
effect of a provision relating to patents in a mixed agreement, and holding that the
substantive EU law relating to patents had not been sufficiently regulated in Union law
to enable the Court to give a Union-wide ruling on this matter).
30. Leaving aside the questions of the interpretation of Article 351 TFEU, see infra
Part III, and of the specific category of agreements concluded between the EU Member
States inter se, see infra Part II, the question of the status of Member States' agreements
has been analyzed notably by Robert Schfitze, EC Law and International Agreements of the
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This Essay will, first, provide a general discussion on the
status in Union law of agreements concluded by EU Member
States. Second, brief discussions will follow on the specific nature
of agreements concluded between the Member States inter se as
well as on the special status of agreements concluded before the
Member State concerned became a member of the Union. Third,
the main part of this Essay will address different categories of
agreements concluded by Member States in order to provide a
more refined picture of the legal relevance of such agreements
for Union law. The final Section will provide a summary and
some basic conclusions.
I. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BYEUMEMBER STATES:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are four main reasons why some international
agreements do not count the EU among their contracting
parties. First, many agreements were concluded by Member
States before they became EU members or before an EU
competence in a particular area became clearly established. This
category, which often overlaps with the fourth category
mentioned below, includes the UN Charter 31 and most
constitutions establishing specialized UN agencies such as the
International Maritime Organization ("IMO") and the
International Labour Organisation ("ILO").
Second, the agreement may concern a matter that is still
outside an EU competence. It is true, however, that with the
development of Union law, including the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon,32 the listing of such matters is not easy.
Third, the EU Commission or the Council may prefer, for
political or other non-legal reasons, not to conclude an
agreement despite the existence of a Union competence to do so
Member States-An Ambivalent Relationship 7,9 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 387, 432
(2006); JAN KLABBERS, TREATY CONFLICT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009); and Jan
Willem van Rossem, Interaction between EU Law and International Law in the Light of
Intertanko and Kadi: The Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but Not the
Community, 40 NETH. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 183 (2009). Concerning maritime law, see
RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 93-95, 123-25, 136-38.
31. U.N. Charter arts. 102-05 (except for Germany, which joined the UN after it
had become a member of the EU); see also KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 153.
32. Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 3, 2007 O.J. C 306.
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and, in the case of a multilateral convention, despite the
existence in the agreement of a clause enabling an integration
organization like the EU to become a contracting party. For
instance, the EU has refrained from concluding some bilateral
cooperation agreements with third states on the ground that the
latter have refused to include in the agreement a so-called
human rights clause requested by the EU.3 3
Fourth, a multilateral agreement may be closed to EU
adherence by limiting the right to adhere to "states." The
agreement, in other words, does not contain a so-called REIO
(regional economic integration organization) or RIO (regional
integration organization) clause enabling an integration
organization such as the EU to become a contracting party. This
is an important reason why the EU still has not adhered to a
number of international law-making conventions, including
human rights conventions34 and conventions adopted under the
auspices of most specialized UN agencies.35 The above-
mentioned endeavor clauses contained in some Council
decisions instructing the EU Member States to work for EU
adherence clauses to be inserted into some maritime
conventions36 have not had the desired effect, and in a Statement
on Maritime Safety made by the Member States in 2008, they-
33. See, e.g., Barbara Brandtner & Allan Rosas, Human Rights and the External
Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice, 9 EUR.J. INT'L L.
468, 473-77 (1998).
34. With respect to human rights conventions, there is by now one exception and
one reservation: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/61/49, at 65 (Dec. 27, 2009),
is open to regional integration organizations (meaning essentially the EU) and the EU
concluded the convention in November 2009. See Council Decision No. 2010/48/EC
Concerning the Conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2010 O.J. L 23/35. According to
TEU Article 6(2), the Union "shall accede" to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter ECHR], but such accession still requires negotiations with the
contracting parties, which have not been concluded at the time of writing.
35. But the EU is a member of the World Trade Organization ("WNTO") and the
Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO"). See generally RACHEL FRID, THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE EC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1995); THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN EVER STRONGER
PARTNERSHIP (Jan Wouters et al. eds., 2006).
36. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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and not the EU-make the "firm commitment" to express their
consent to be bound by a number of such conventions.37
EU primary law in many ways recognizes the right of
Member States to conclude, or continue to adhere to, certain
international agreements. Just to mention a few examples, Article
34(2) TEU refers to the Member States' participation in
international organizations and conferences.38 Moreover, Articles
165(3), 166(3), 167(3), and 168(3) TFEU provide that not only
the Union but also Member States shall foster cooperation with
third countries and international organizations in the fields of
education and sport, vocational training, culture, and public
health, respectively.39 Finally, Articles 191(4), 209(2), 212(3), and
214(4) spell out that the competence of the Union to conclude
agreements with third countries and international organizations
in the fields of environmental protection, development
cooperation, economic, financial, and technical cooperation,
and humanitarian aid, respectively, are without prejudice to
Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies
and to conclude agreements. 40
Also, EU legislative acts often refer to agreements that bind
EU Member States rather than the EU itself. The situations
discussed below include references that may have the effect of
making an agreement concluded by Member States directly
relevant to EU law. In some other cases, such references may
simply exclude an agreement binding on Member States from
the scope of application of EU law.4'
37. Council of the European Union, Statement by the Member States on Maritime
Safety, Council Doc. No. 15859/08 ADD 1 (Nov. 19, 2008).
38. TEU, supra note 4, art. 34(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 35.
39. TFEU, supra note 6, arts. 165(3), 166(3), 167(3), 168(3), 2010 0.J. C 83, at
120-23.
40. TFEU, supra note 6, arts. 191(4), 209(2), 212(3), 214(4), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 133,
141-43.
41. An example is offered by a 2004 directive relating to environmental liability,
which provides that the directive does not apply to environmental damage arising from
an incident in respect of which liability or compensation falls within the scope of any of
the international conventions listed in an annex to the directive if the relevant
convention is in force in a given Member State. Parliament and Council Directive
2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying
of Environmental Damage, art. 4(2), 2004 O.J. L 143/56, at 61 [hereinafter
Environmental Liability Directive].
1313
1314 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1304
That said, many agreements concluded by EU Member
States, without the EU's participation as a contracting party, are
to be considered extraneous to Union law in the strict sense and
to be seen as part of the national law of the Member States in
question. As they do not form part of the Union's legal order,
they are not governed by the Union law principles of primacy,
direct applicability, and direct effect (which is not to say, of
course, that they cannot be directly applicable to and have direct
effect under the national legal order in question).42
Nor can such agreements, as a rule, be given an
authoritative interpretation by the Union courts in the context of
preliminary ruling proceedings. As the Court has recently
recalled, the Court "does not, in principle, have jurisdiction to
interpret, in preliminary ruling proceedings, international
agreements concluded between Member States and non-member
countries."43 This does not prevent the Court, in the context of
infringement actions, from assessing the meaning of an
agreement binding on a Member State in the same way it can
assess the meaning of other parts of national law to determine
whether there has been a breach of Union law.4 4
As agreements concluded by Member States form part of
their national law, the agreements, as a general rule, have to yield
to norms of Union law, be it primary law, international
agreements concluded by the EU, or secondary legislation (the
principle of primacy of Union law). From a purely public
international law point of view, it may seem problematic that
commitments entered into vis-t-vis third states cannot always be
honored by an EU Member State.45 One commentator has thus
argued that "the choice for having Community law prevail is a
42. See Schutze, supra note 30, at 432; van Rossem, supra note 30, at 199-200. Contra
KLABBERS, supra note 30 (offering a more critical analysis of the idea that agreements
concluded by Member States are simply part of their national law).
43. TNT Express Nederland BV v. AXA Versicherung AG, Case C-533/08, [2010]
E.C.R. I_ (delivered May 4, 2010) (not yet reported), 61; see Bogiatzi v. Deutscher
Luftpool, Case C-301/08, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10,185, 24 (concerning agreements between
the EU Member States); Hartmann, Case C-162/98, [1998] E.C.R. 1-7083, 1 9;
Vandeweghe v. Berufsgenossenschaft fir die Chemische Industrie, Case 130/73, [1973]
E.C.R. 1329, 1 2.
44. See, e.g., Commission v. Finland, Case C-118/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10,889, 38-
43; Nordspedizionieri di Danielis Livio v. Commission, Case C-62/05 P, [2007] E.C.R. I-
8647, 11 37-46.
45. See KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 115.
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rather parochial one, which would not be tolerated if coming
from a state. Surely, not even the United States could insist on
fencing off its domestic law from international law without being
subjected to severe critiques."46
It is submitted that this comparison is not a valid one.47 The
Union is not fencing off its domestic law from international law
binding on the Union but simply insisting that norms created by
the Member States that the Union has not accepted, be they
unilateral acts (national legislation) or international agreements,
remain part of the national legal orders. This is the price to be
paid for the supranational character of the EU, which constitutes
a constitutional order rather than an international legal order in
the classical sense. 48 Seen from the perspective of the unity and
efficacy of the Union legal order, it almost goes without saying
that Union law cannot allow a Member State to derogate from its
Union law obligations simply by concluding an agreement with
one or more third states. According to the case law of the Court,
even a national constitution will have to yield to conflicting
norms of Union law.49
That said, EU primary law contains a clear exception to the
general principle that Union law prevails: by virtue of Article 351
TFEU, a Member State may be able to invoke an international
agreement concluded by it before it became an EU member.
When the European Economic Community was established, it
was thought unreasonable for Community law to create an
immediate obligation to disrespect agreements that the Member
46. Id. at 226.
47. See Schittze, supra note 30, at 432 (observing (rightly, it is believed) that the EU
vision "does not automatically reject a monistic relationship between Community and
international law. However, in order to protect the integrity of the Community legal
order, a distinction is drawn between Community agreements and Member State
agreements."); see also van Rossem, supra note 30, at 200-02.
48. On the constitutional nature of the EU legal order, see, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Armfin von Bogdandy & Jirgen Bast eds., 2d ed.
2009); ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 2.
49. See, e.g., Angelidaki v. Organismos Nomarkhiaki Aflodiikisi Rethimnis, joined
Cases C-378-80/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-3071, 207; Kreil v. Germany, Case C-285/98,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-69; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-149/79, [1980] E.C.R. 3881, f 16,
19; Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide
und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 3; see also ROSAS & ARMATI, supra
note 2, at 56.
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States had concluded before they had committed themselves to
the new Community legal order.50
For reasons of clarity and legal security, it would be
tempting to consider that all other agreements-in other words,
agreements concluded after the beginning of EU membership-
would obey the normal rule (implying that they form part of
national law only). Legal reality is somewhat more complex,
however. One can distinguish between the following four
situations:
With third Member
countries States Inter Se
Agreements concluded by 1 2
Member States prior to EU
membership
Agreements concluded 3 4
during EU membership
The following discussion will be especially relevant for category 3.
As some important international agreements predate the
establishment, on January 1, 1958, of the then European
Economic Community,5 1 and as many Member States have joined
the EU fairly recently (three in 1995, ten in 2004, and two in
2007), it is also necessary to take into account some salient
aspects of Article 351 TFEU and the regime it establishes for
agreements concluded with third countries prior to EU
membership (category 1). The specific problems related to
agreements concluded between two or more EU Member States,
50. But another approach was adopted in Articles 105 and 106 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167
[hereinafter Euratom Treaty], which are based on a less generous acceptance of prior
agreements concluded by Member States. See KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 117.
51. To mention just a few examples, the UN Charter, supra note 31, the
constitutions of most specialized UN agencies, and the ECHR, supra note 34. In most
cases, these conventions were concluded by the six original Member States before
January 1, 1958, i.e., before the entry into force of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
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without the participation of third countries (categories 2 and 4),
can only be briefly mentioned here.52
II. AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE EU MEMBER
STATES INTER SE
Union primary law contains some explicit references to
agreements to be concluded by the Member States inter se. While
Article 293 of the EC Treaty, which referred to negotiations
between the Member States with a view, inter alia, to abolish
double taxation within the Union, has been repealed by the
Treaty of Lisbon,53 the TFEU still refers to the possibility of
regional unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Article 30 TFEU).
While according to Title VI TEU, as it existed prior to the Treaty
of Lisbon (the "third pillar" of the Union), the EU Council
could establish conventions that the Member States could adopt
on the basis of a Council recommendation in order to
implement police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
the Treaty of Lisbon repealed the third pillar, which is
henceforth integrated into Title V of Part Three TFEU, implying
a competence to adopt Union legislative acts.54
Also, Union secondary legislation may refer to the possibility
of agreements between the Member States. An example is
provided by a provision in the regulation concerning jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
52. For more extensive analysis see, e.g., Bruno De Witte, Chameleonic Member States:
Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International Agreements, in THE MANY FACES
OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAW 231-67 (Bruno De Witte et al. eds., 2001); Allan Rosas,
Relations entre les Etats membres de l'Union europdenne: Le droit international public y a-t-il
encore sa place? [Relations between the Member States of the European Union: International Law
Is There Still RoomI, in MtLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DEJEAN-PIERRE PUISSOCHET: L'tTAT
SOUVERAIN DANS LE MONDE D'AUJOURD'HUI 255-65 (A. Pedone ed., 2008).
53. On Article 293 of the EC Treaty see, e.g., KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 207-08;
Schfitze, supra note 30, at 416-20.
54. During a transitional period, however, the legal effects of the conventions and
other third-pillar acts that were adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon may be preserved until those acts are repealed, annulled, or amended in
implementation of the treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. See 2010
Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol on Transitional Provisions, arts. 9-10, 2010 0.J. C
83, at 325-26.
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commercial matters ("Brussels I").55 According to this provision,
the regulation "shall not affect any conventions to which the
Member States are parties and which in relation to particular
matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of
judgments."5 6 While this provision would appear to give
precedence to conventions concluded by Member States before
the entry into force of the regulation,57 provided that they
concern "particular matters," paragraph 2 of the same article
instructs the application of the rule expressed in paragraph 1
"[w]ith a view to its uniform interpretation."5 8 In a recent
judgment, the Court held, first, that the provision in question
also relates to situations that are confined entirely within the EU
and, second, that the application of specialized conventions
binding on Member States "cannot compromise the principles
which underlie judicial cooperation in civil and commercial
matters in the European Union" and that therefore their
application is subject to certain conditions.59
These examples concern agreements that become relevant
for Union law, for instance, by virtue of an express reference in
Union primary or secondary law. EU Member States may also
conclude agreements outside the Union law framework that are
designed to promote closer cooperation between them with a
view to their subsequent conversion into Union legal acts. The
Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of internal border
controls of 1985,60 and the Priim Convention of 2005 relating to
increased cross-border cooperation as regards combating
55. Council Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 71, 2001 O.J. L 12/1,
at 16 [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; see also Rome I Regulation, supra note 15, art.
25, at 15-16; Rome II Regulation, supra note 15, art. 28, at 47; Schfitze, supra note 30, at
437.
56. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 55, art. 71, at 16.
57. TNT Express Nederland BV v. AXA Versicherung AG, Case C-533/08, [2010]
E.C.R. I_ (delivered May 4, 2010) (not yet reported), 38-39.
58. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 55, art. 71, at 16.
59. TNT Express Nederland, [2010] E.C.R. I_, 47-56.
60. See 2010 Consolidated TEU & TFEU, Protocol on the Schengen Acquis
Integrated into the Framework of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 290.
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terrorism, cross-border crime, and illegal migration 61 are cases in
point.
That said, agreements concluded between all Member States
in particular run the risk of being considered as efforts to
circumvent the Union's legislative and other procedures
established by the TEU and the TFEU. This is fairly obvious in
areas of exclusive Union competence 62 but may arise also in
other contexts, notably in areas of shared competence where the
principle of preemption prevails.63 Member States are also, in
principle, prevented from amending the Union treaties through
agreements inter se that do not respect the treaties' provisions
concerning amendments thereto.64 Any agreement concluded by
the Member States needs in any case to conform to with Union
law.65
In one respect, agreements concluded exclusively between
EU Member States enjoy a weaker status than agreements
concluded with third countries: according to settled case law, the
former do not fall under Article 351 TFEU concerning
agreements concluded prior to EU membership.66 Article 351, in
61. Council of the European Union, Convention on the Stepping up of Cross-
Border Cooperation, Particularly in Combating Terrorism, Cross-Border Crime and
Illegal Migration, Council Doc. No. 10900/05 (July 7, 2005).
62. See AETR-ERTA, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 11 70-77; Schuitze, supra note
30, at 412.
63. See TFEU, supra note 6, art. 2(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 50 (noting that the Member
States can, in areas of shared competence, exercise their competence only "to the extent
that the Union has not exercised its competence"); c.f Parliament v. Council, Joined
Cases C-181/91 & 248/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-3685 (concerning a situation of so-called
parallel competence); see also Schfitze, supra note 30, at 414-16.
64. See Defrenne v. Socidt6 anonyme belge de navigation adrienne Sabena, Case
43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455; Schatze, supra note 30, at 414. The procedures for amending
the treaties are laid down in Article 48 TEU, supra note 6, art. 48, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 41-
43.
65. See Rosas, supra note 52, at 258. In Commission v. Germany, Germany was
prevented from relying on a bilateral agreement with Poland to justify reserving the
advantages of the agreement to undertakings established in Germany. Case C-546/07,
[2010] E.C.R. I_ (delivered Jan. 21, 2010) (not yet reported); see also BENYON, supra
note 12, at 107-08.
66. See Budtjovicky Budvar Nat'l Corp. v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, Case C-478/07,
[2009] E.C.R. 1-7721, 11 98-99; Ravil SARL v. Bellon Import SARL, Case C-469/00,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-5053, 37; Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission, Joined Cases C-
241-42/91 P, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743, 84; Exportur v. LOR, Case C-3/91, [1992] E.C.R. I-
5529, 1 8; Matteucci v. Communaut6 Francaise of Belgium, Case 235/87, [1988] E.C.R.
5589; Minist4re Public v. Deserbais, Case 286/86, [1988] E.C.R. 4907, 1 17-18;
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fact, refers to agreements concluded between one or more
Member States, on the one hand, and one or more third
countries on the other.67 This means that agreements concluded
by Member States inter se cannot be invoked to derogate from the
principle of primacy of Union law. In this respect, there is thus
no difference between such agreements concluded prior to
(category 2) or after (category 4) EU membership.
According to the case law, this conclusion also applies to
multilateral agreements that count third states among the
contracting parties: Article 351 TFEU cannot be invoked in the
relations between the Member State parties to the agreement.
Many multilateral conventions, however, are of such a nature that
a violation of a provision by one party will necessarily affect the
enjoyment of all the other parties' rights under the convention
(including, as the case may be, non-EU states).ss Examples
include human rights conventions as well as conventions that
prohibit or restrict the production or stockpiling of certain
substances, the impairment of the natural environment, or
national sovereignty claims over common areas such as the high
seas. In this case, an EU Member State may be entitled to invoke
Article 351 TFEU in order to resist the application of a
conflicting norm of EU law in the relations between the Member
States by arguing that such application would amount to a
violation of the convention, which would necessarily affect the
rights of not only EU Member States but also third-state parties to
the convention.69 This leads to a discussion of Article 351 TFEU
more generally.
Conegate Ltd. v. HM Customs & Excise, Case 121/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1007, 1J 25-26;
Commission v. Italy, Case 10/62, [1962] E.C.R. 1.
67. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 351, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 195.
68. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 41(1)(b)(i), 58(1)(b)(i),
60(2) (c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd
Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 42(b) (ii), U.N. Doc A/56/10, at 294;
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND
COMMENTARIES 259-60 (2002).
69. See Rosas, supra note 52, at 260.
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III. ARTICLE 351 TFEU
Article 351 (1) TFEU allows a derogation from the principle
of primacy of EU law70 but only in relation to agreements
concluded prior to EU membership and, in principle, only to
treaty relations between Member States and third states (category
1 above). According to settled case law, the purpose of the
provision is to establish that the application of EU law does "not
affect the duty of the Member State concerned to respect the
rights of nonmember countries under a prior agreement and to
perform its obligations thereunder."7 The Court has also
recognized that Article 351 (1) TFEU may allow derogations from
not only Union's secondary law but also its primary law, such as
provisions of the TEU and the TFEU.72 The Court has added that
the provision would not achieve its purpose if it did not imply a
duty on the part of the Union institutions not to impede the
performance of the obligations of Member States that stem from
a prior agreement. However, the purpose of this duty of Union
institutions is to permit the Member State concerned to perform
its obligations under the prior agreement and does not bind the
Union vis-A-vis the non-member country in question.73
In order to benefit from the derogation clause of Article
351 (1) TFEU, the agreement must have established an obligation
that the Member State concerned cannot honor if it applies a
norm of EU law fully. In a recent Court case concerning
proposals submitted by a Member State to modify two maritime
IMO conventions, the Member State concerned argued that it
could rely on the then Article 307 EC Treaty (now Article 351
TFEU) as it had become a member of the IMO before it joined
the European Community. The Court did not accept this
70. Schitze, supra note 30, at 391 (speaking of "suspended primacy").
71. Attorney General v. Burgoa, Case C-812/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1-2787, 1 8 (citing
Commission v. Italy, Case C-10/61, [1962] E.C.R. 1); see also KLABBERS, supra note 30, at
120; PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAw 304-12 (2006); van
Rossem, supra note 30, at 16.
72. See Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council, Joined Cases C-402, 415/05 P,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-6351, 1 301; The Queen v. H.M. Treasury, Case C-124/95, [1997] E.C.R.
1-81, 11 56-61.
73. See, e.g., Burgoa, [1980] E.R.C. 1-2787, 9; Opinion of Advocate General
Jidskinen, Commission v. Slovakia, Case C-264/09, E.C.R. I- (delivered Mar. 15, 2011)
(not yet reported), 1 77. The Court thus has not accepted what Schfitze, supra note 30,
at 395, refers to as the "mortgage theory," according to which the Union would have
become bound by such prior agreements binding on the Member States.
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argument, noting that the Member State had not established that
it was required to submit the contested proposal by virtue of the
IMO's founding documents or legal instruments drawn up by the
organization. 4
According to Article 351(3) TFEU, Member States, "in
applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph," shall
take into account the fact that the advantages accorded under
the treaties by each Member State form an integral part of the
establishment of the Union and are "thereby inseparably linked
with the creation of common institutions, the conferring of
powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by
all the other Member States." 7 This provision seems to establish
an obligation to interpret, as far as possible, the agreements
concluded with third countries in conformity with the Union law
obligations of the Member State concerned.
Article 351 does not cover agreements concluded by
Member States after they have become EU members, even if the
Union had not, at the time of the conclusion of the agreement,
adopted common rules. While this principle seems to have been
recognized in Court case law,76 the original version of what is now
Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 307 of the EC Treaty) was less clear
on this point. The provision now refers explicitly to agreements
concluded either "before 1 January 1958" or, for acceding states,
"before the date of their accession" and thus does not seem to
leave room for any margin of interpretation in this regard.
As the agreement needs to have been concluded prior to EU
membership, amendments introduced subsequently cannot
benefit from the rule in Article 351(1), unless it can be
established that they are in implementation of an obligation
already concluded before the Member State became an EU
member. Such amendments may even lead to a reassessment of
the prior agreement in its entirety, in which case the Member
State concerned may be barred from invoking not only the
amended provisions but also the provisions of the original
74. See Commission v. Greece, Case C-45/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-701, 11 34-37.
75. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 351, 2010 0.J.-C 83, at 195.
76. See Procureur Gdndral pros la Cour d'Appel de Pau v. Arbelaiz-Emazabel, Case
181/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2961; Kramer, Joined Cases 3, 4, 6/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1279; see also
Schfitze, supra note 30, at 433-37. Cf KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 173.
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agreement that have been maintained and confirmed in the
renegotiation process.77
Article 351(2) TFEU requires the Member State or states
concerned "to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the
incompatibilities established."7 ' This may under certain
circumstances imply an obligation to withdraw from the
agreement in question. 9 However, if a multilateral convention
allows withdrawal only at certain intervals (for instance, every ten
years), Article 351(1) may allow a Member State to remain bound
by the agreement until the next opportunity to withdraw.80 On
the other hand, an obligation to take all appropriate steps to
eliminate the incompatibilities between Union law and the
agreement may also arise in situations where there is risk of a
conflict between the agreement and a future norm of Union law,
even though Article 351(2) refers to "incompatibilities
established."81 If the Member State concerned has not taken any
steps to eliminate an incompatibility in accordance with the
second paragraph of Article 351, it may at some point lose its
right to invoke the first paragraph.82
The preceding discussion has been based on the assumption
that when the conditions of Article 351 are fulfilled, a Member
State may, at least during a certain period, successfully invoke
this provision in order to resist the application of a conflicting
norm of Union law. However, in its famous judgment in Kadi v.
Council, which concerned the status in EU law of sanction
77. See the "Open Skies" judgments concerning infringement cases brought by the
Commission against a number of Member States for having concluded bilateral air
transport agreement with the United States, e.g., Commission v. Sweden, Case C-468/98,
[2002] E.C.R. 1-9575, 1 37. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
78. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 351, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 195.
79. See Commission v. Portugal, Case C-62/98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-5171, 1 50; see also
Commission v. Austria, Case C-203/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-935, 61; KLABBERS, supra note
30, at 135.
80. See Austia, [2005] E.C.R. 1-935, 1 63.
81. See Commission v. Austria, Case C-205/06 [2009] E.C.R. 1-1301; Commission v.
Finland, Case C-118/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10,889; Commission v. Sweden, Case C-249/06,
[20091 E.C.R. 1-1335. These cases concerned bilateral investment agreements that were
found to potentially jeopardize the implementation of future EU measures to restrict,
on the basis of the then Articles 57, 59, and 60 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 64, 66, and
75 TFEU), movements of capital and payments between the Member States and third
countnes.
82. This seems to be the implicit consequence of the reasoning in Commission v.
Austfia, [2005] E.C.R. 1-935, 59-64.
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decisions adopted by the UN Security Council, the Court held
that the Union legal order contains some core constitutional
principles that form part of the "very foundations" of that order,
notably the protection of fundamental rights, and that Article
307 of the EC Treaty (now Article 351 TFEU) may "in no
circumstances permit any challenge" to those core principles.83
Thus, Member States cannot invoke Article 351(1) TFEU in
order to honor their obligations under the UN Charter,
including binding decisions of the Security Council, if these
obligations contravene basic fundamental rights and rule of law
principles contained in the Union constitutional order.
IV. OTHER AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY MEMBER STATES
THAT MAY BE RELEVANT TO EU LAW
The following discussion will be particularly relevant for
agreements concluded by EU Member States with third countries
(categories 1 and 3 above). That said, some of the hard- and soft-
law effects of agreements concluded by EU Member States
analyzed below may also arise from agreements concluded
between the Member States inter se.
If the matter is approached in terms of the degree of legally
binding force, one can observe a sliding scale ranging from
agreements that become binding on not only the Member States
but also the Union as such, to agreements that, at most, should
or can be "taken into account" as tools of interpretation or as a
bar to the full application of Union law. The following discussion
will be structured as an attempt to grade different types of
agreements moving from "more" to "less" binding instruments.
These different scenarios can be seen as exceptions or caveats to
the general rule that agreements concluded by EU Member
States are nothing more than acts pertaining to their national law
that do not enjoy more enhanced status than acts of national law
in general (leaving aside here the possibility of Member States
invoking Article 351 TFEU with respect to agreements concluded
prior to EU membership).
83. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Foundation v. Council, Joined Cases CA02, 415/05 P,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-6351, 11 303-04; see also Schatze, supra note 30, at 392. Cf Commission
v. United Kingdom, Case C-466/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9427, 23 (stating that the then
Article 307 of the EC Treaty was of general scope and applied "to any international
agreement, irrespective of subject-matter").
2011] INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE EU
There is one category of agreements that, while the
agreements contain norms of public international law that may
also be binding on the Union, does not constitute a real
exception: agreements that reflect general international law
binding on the Union as a subject of international law. It is
settled case law that the Union "must respect international law in
the exercise of its powers." 84 The Court has recognized the
binding force of customary international law particularly in the
contexts of treaty law and the law of the sea.85 In this respect, the
Court has held, inter alia, that some of the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 196986 and of the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea (to which the
EU, in contrast to the 1982 Convention, did not become a
contracting party)8 7 codify customary international law.
These situations do not constitute veritable exceptions to
the rule that agreements concluded by the Member States do not
become part of the Union legal order in itself. The Union is
bound not by the written agreement but by general (customary)
international law as reflected in the agreement. Nevertheless, the
agreement, especially if it is a generally accepted convention of a
"law-making" nature, may in such cases be of considerable
relevance as an indicator of the content of general international
law and may thus serve as an important source of reference for
84. Kadi, [2008] E.C.R. 1-6351, 291; see, e.g., The Queen, on the application of
Intertanko v. Sec'y of State for Transp. (Intertanko), Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057,
1 51.
85. See PieterJan Kuijper, From Dyestuffs to Kosovo Wine: From Avoidance to Acceptance
by the European Community Courts of Customary International Law as a Limit to Community
Action, in ON THE FOUNDATION AND SOURCES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (Ige F.
Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 2003); Allan Rosas, With a Little Help from My Friends:
International Case-Law as a Source of Reference for the EU Courts, 1 THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
YB. OF INT'L L. ANDJURISPRUDENCE 203, 217-29 (2005).
86. See, e.g., A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case C-162/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-3655, 11 45-61; Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, Case T-115/94, [1997] E.C.R.
11-39, 90; see also PieterJan Kuijper, The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 25 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1998).
87. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 19; see Weber v. Universal
Ogden Services, Case C-37/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-2013, 34; ttablissements Armand
Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, Case C-405/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6133, 1 13-14;
Anklagemyndigheden v. Poulsen, Case C-286/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-6046, 1 9-11; see also
Allan Rosas, EUja kansainvdlinen merioikeus [ The EU and the International Law of the Sea],
KANSAINVALISTYvA OIKEUSJUHLAKIRJA PROFESSORI KARI HAKAPAA 419, 427-32 (2005).
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the determination of an international customary norm binding
on the Union.
A. Agreements that Become Binding on the Union through Succession
In International Fruit, the Court was asked to rule on the
legal status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT 1947") under the Community legal order, in view of the
fact that the Community at that time had not formally adhered to
the GATT.88 The Court held that the provisions of GATT 1947
nevertheless had the effect of binding the Community.89
Principally two arguments were invoked in support of this ruling:
First, the Community had assumed the powers previously
exercised by the Member States in the area covered by GATT
(trade in goods, which is part of the common commercial policy
and thus an area of exclusive competence), and the Member
States, by conferring those powers to the Community, had shown
"their wish to bind it by the obligations entered into under
[GATT]."" Second, this transfer of powers had "been recognized
by the other contracting parties."91
The situation can be viewed as a form of succession: the
Union replaces the Member States as the bearer of rights and
obligation even if the agreement has not been formally
concluded by the Union. Article 106 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) even
expresses a preference for such a scenario.92 That, with respect to
other parts of Union law, the Court will not reach this conclusion
lightly is borne out by the fact that the Court has come to the
opposite conclusion on the International Convention for the
88. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. In 1994, the Community became a member of
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and hence a contracting party to GATT and
other WTO agreements. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3.
89. Int'l Fruit Co. v. Produktschap Voor Groenten en Fruit,Joined Cases 21-24/72,
[1972] E.C.R. 1219, 11 14-18; see also Schfitze, supra note 30, at 394-99; van Rossem,
supra note 30, at 30-31.
90. Int'lFruit, [1972] E.C.R. 1219,1 15.
91. Id. 1 16.
92. Euratom Treaty, supra note 50; see KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 117.
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Prevention of Pollution from Ships ("Marpol 73/78"),13 the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage ("Oil Pollution Liability Convention") and the
International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage ("Oil Pollution
Fund Convention"),94 and the Warsaw Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air.95
The Court, in fact, seems to require a "full" transfer of
powers previously exercised by the Member States in order for
the Union to become directly bound by the agreement in
question 96-in other words, the agreement concerns a subject
area in which the Union has exclusive competence (e.g.,
common commercial policy, fisheries, the AETR-ERTA
principle).97 Moreover, if the transfer of powers is to produce
legal effects for third states as well, some kind of recognition
seems to be required, in accordance with what the Court said in
International Fruit.
B. Agreements that Are Integrated into the Union Legal Order through
a Renvoi
There are also situations in which the provisions of an
international agreement can be seen as part of the Union legal
order, even if the EU has neither adhered to the agreement nor
become internationally bound by it by way of succession.
93. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2,
1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships of November 2, 1973, Feb. 17, 1978, 94 Stat.
2297, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 [hereinafter Marpol 73/78]; see Criminal Proceedings against
Peralta, Case C-379/92, [1994] E.C.R. 1-3453, 1 16; Intertanko, Case C-308/06, [2008]
E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 48.
94. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Oil Pollution Liability Convention]; International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage,
Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Oil Pollution Fund Convention]; see
Commune de Mesquer v. Total France, Case C-188/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4501, 85.
95. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11; see Bogiatzi v. Deutscher
Luftpool, Case C-301/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-10,185, 1 27-32.
96. See Bogiatzi, [2009] E.C.R. 1-10,185, It 32-33; see also Intertanko, Case C-308/06,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 49.
97. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (regarding the concept of
exclusive competence).
1327
1328 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1304
situations in which Union legal acts refer to an international
agreement (renvoi) in a way that shows a willingness on the part
of the Union legislator to make some or all provisions of the
agreement directly applicable in the Union legal order.
An example is offered by the European Agreement
Concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in
International Road Transport (this is the agreement that gave
rise to the AETR-ERTA principle).*98 The Court has held that "the
AETR Agreement forms part of Community law and that the
Court has jurisdiction to interpret it."99 The Court referred, inter
alia, to the fact that the relevant EU regulation expressly
provided that the agreement, instead of the rules of the
regulation, "shall apply" to certain forms of international road
transport operations. 100 A similar reference to an international
agreement to which the Union is not a contracting party, in this
case the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"),'(o is found in a
Union regulation of 1982.102 As a later regulation contains a
weaker reference, stating that it shall apply "in compliance with"
the objectives, principles, and provisions of CITES, 03 the Court
has refrained from ruling on whether the Court has jurisdiction
to interpret CITES as such but has held that in any case CITES
must be taken into account in the interpretation of the
regulation.104
98. European Agreement Concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in
International Road Transport, July 1, 1970, 993 U.N.T.S. 143.
99. Cipra v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Mistelbach, Case C-439/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-
745, 1 24.
100. Id. 3; see Council Regulation 3820/85 on the Harmonization of Certain
Social Legislation Relating to Road Transport, art. 2(2), 1985 O.J. L 370/1.
101. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
102. Council Regulation 3626/82 on the Implementation in the Community of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
1982 O.J. L 384/1.
103. Council Regulation 338/97 on the Protection of Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora by Regulating Trade Therein, art. 1, 1997 O.J. L 61/1, at 3.
104. Criminal Proceedings against Tridon, Case C-510/99, [2001] E.C.R. 1-7777, It
23-25; see also Criminal Proceedings against Nilsson, Case C-154/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-
12,733, 1 39. In Commission v. Council, Case C-370/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-8916, the Court
held that a Council decision establishing a Union position to be adopted in a CITES
body required a proper legal basis.
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An example of a renvoi proper is offered by a regulation,
passed in 2009, concerning the liability of carriers of passengers
by sea in the event of accidents. 05 This regulation, taking effect
on January 1, 2012, at the latest, not only incorporates the main
part of the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of
Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea 1974,106 but also
incorporates and makes binding parts of the IMO Reservation
and Guidelines for the Implementation of the Athens
Convention. This is thus an example of a Union legislative act
incorporating not only an international agreement but also a soft
law instrument.
To take an example where the renvoi to an international
agreement is to be found not in an autonomous legislative act of
the Union, but in an international agreement to which the
Union itself has formally adhered: the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), which,
as one of the WTO agreements, is binding on the Union (albeit
as a mixed agreement), contains several references to other
conventions on intellectual property rights (to which the Union
has not adhered) in a way that integrates parts of these
conventions into the TRIPS regime.10 7 Similar references are to
be found, for instance, in Union legislation relating to the Union
trademark.108
In these situations, the renvoi to an international agreement
may serve to integrate some or all of the provisions of the
agreement into the Union legal order so that the text of the
agreement becomes applicable in this order, even if the EU is not
105. Parliament and Council Regulation 392/2009 on the Liability of Passengers by
Sea in the Event of Accidents, 2009 O.J. L 131/24.
106. Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage
by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19; see also Erik Rosaeg, The Athens Convention on
Passenger Liability and the EU, in The Hamburg Lectures on Maritime Affairs 2007 & 2008, 16
HAMBURG STUDIES ON MARITIME AFFAIRS 55, 61, 74-75 U. Basedow et al. eds., 2010).
107. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, arts. 1-5, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (referring to a number of conventions
relating to intellectual property rights that have not been concluded by the EU).
108. See Council Regulation No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, arts. 7, 29,
1994 O.J. L 11/1, amended by Council Regulation No. 3288/94, 1994 Oj. L 349/83
(cited in Am. Clothing Assocs. v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market,
Joined Cases C-202, 208/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. 1-6933). Regulation 40/94 has been
replaced by Council Regulation No. 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark (codified
version), 2009 O.J. L 78/1.
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a contracting party. Each case has to be analyzed on its own
merits. Some references to international agreements may be of a
"weaker" nature so that the provisions referred to do not become
directly applicable but should rather be observed or at least taken
into account in the application of Union acts.'09
Even if certain provisions of the agreement do become
applicable, this legal effect is produced by the Union's
autonomous legal act referring to the agreement and not by the
agreement itself. The agreement simply provides an applicable
text rather than assumes the same status as agreements concluded
on behalf of the Union.
This also means that the renvoi does not produce legal
effects with respect to third states (unless the situation can be
construed as a case of succession in accordance with the
International Fruit case law mentioned above). As the agreement
becomes applicable through the Union's legislative act, there
does not seem to be a hierarchy between the agreement and the
legislative act (it will be recalled that international agreements
concluded by the Union prevail, in principle, over autonomous
legislative acts). 10
This would also mean that the legality of the legislative act
cannot be reviewed in the light of the provisions of the
agreement (even assuming that the relevant provisions of the
agreement would be precise and unconditional enough to satisfy
the requirements of direct effect)."' In Intertanko, the Court held
that the validity of an EU directive on ship-source pollution could
not be reviewed in the light of Marpol 73/78, even though some
of its provisions referred to certain provisions of Marpol. The fact
that the directive had the objective of incorporating certain rules
set out in Marpol was not sufficient for it to compel the Court to
review the directive's legality in the light of the Convention." 2
109. See infra Parts IV.D, I.E.
110. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
111. According to settled case law, direct effect of an international agreement
binding upon the EU is a condition for reviewing the legality of a Union legislative act in
the light of the agreement. See Intertanko, Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 45
(confirming earlier case law); see also ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 2, at 48-49, 69-72.
112. See Intertanko, [2008) E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 50. The directive in question was
Parliament and Council Directive 2005/35/EC on Ship-Source Pollution and on the
Introduction of Penalties for Infringements, 2005 O.J. L 255/11 [hereinafter Ship-
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C. Agreements that Are Concluded by the Member States in the Interest
of the Union
In the judgment relating to the AETR Agreement referred
to above,"> the Court, in concluding that the agreement formed
part of Union law, mentioned not only the fact that a Union
legislative act provided that the agreement was to apply to certain
international road transport operations, but also that the
agreement had been brought into force in the Community by
another legislative act,114 the preamble of which stated that in
ratifying or acceding to the agreement, the Member States "acted
in the interest and on behalf of the Community." In the original
AETR-ERTA judgment of 1971, the Court had accepted that the
Member States, despite a transfer of powers to the Community in
1969, could conclude the agreement, as a considerable part of
the international negotiations had taken place before 1969, and
reopening the negotiations at such a late stage in order to enable
the Community to become a contracting party would have caused
considerable difficulties.'1 5
With respect to International Labour Organisation ("ILO")
conventions, the Court has again acknowledged that they are not
open to EU adherence and that, accordingly, Union competence
"may, if necessary, be exercised through the medium of the
Member States acting jointly in the Community's interest."" 6
While the right to conclude the agreements by the Member
States was recognized by the Court in the cases referred to above,
a practice later emerged whereby the EU Council adopts a
decision expressly authorizing the Member States to conclude an
agreement even if, under internal Union law, the agreement
should be concluded by the Union, either alone (because it
covers an area that belongs in its entirety to its exclusive
Source Pollution Directive]. It has been subsequently amended by Directive
2009/123/EC, 2009 O.J. L 280/52. See van Rossem, supra note 30, at 33-34.
113. Cipra and Kvasnicka v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Mistelbach, Case C-439/01,
[2003] E.C.R. 1-745.
114. Council Regulation 2829/77 on the Bringing into Force of the European
Agreement concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles Engaged in International Road
Transport (AETR), 1977 O.J. L 334/11.
115. AETR-ERTA, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 180-90.
116. Opinion on Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organisation
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
1061, 11 5, 37.
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competence) or together with the Member States (for instance,
because only some of its provisions belong to an area of exclusive
competence). This device has been used notably with respect to
multilateral maritime agreements concluded under the auspices
of the IMO and ILO-agreements that do not contain a clause
enabling EU adherence and are thus open to states only.' 17
With respect to some of these conventions, the given reason
for the need for a Council authorization was that some of their
provisions affected Union law in the field of international
procedural law and, to be more precise, concerned jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters.118 Thus the Union's exclusive competence
in this field called for an explicit decision authorizing Member
States to adhere, even if the Union apparently did not wish to
exercise its competence with respect to the main substance of the
conventions in question. As far as an ILO convention goes, the
Council decision refers to Union competence concerning the
coordination of social security schemes.'19
Council decisions that authorize Member States to adhere to
international agreements also exist in the nuclear field120 and in
the area of international procedural law (private international
law). 121 Concerning air services agreements and, in the area of
international procedural law, agreements affecting the Rome I or
II Regulations 122 or the Brussels II bis Regulation, 23 the Council
had adopted general framework regulations that establish a
117. See Council Decision No. 2007/431/EC (Maritime Labour Convention Decision),
2007 O.J. L 161/63; Oil Fund Convention Decision, supra note 21, at 23; Erik Rosaeg,
The Rebirth of the HNS Convention, in 1 ScRITTI IN ONORE DI FRANCESCO BERLINGIERI:
NUMERO SPECIALE DI IL DIRITO MARITIMO 852, 854 (2010). See generally Bunkers
Convention Decision, supra note 21; HNS Convention Decision, supra note 21;
RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 93-95, 123-25, 136-39.
118. Brussels I Regulation, supra note 55.
119. Maritime Labour Convention Decision, 2007 O.J. L 161/63 (referencing Article
42 of the EC Treaty (now Article 48 TFEU)).
120. See Council Decision No. 2007/727/EC (Slovenia Decision), 2007 O.J. L
294/23; Council Decision No. 2004/294/EC (Paris Convention Protocol Decision 2004),
2004 O.J. L 97/53; Council Decision No. 2003/882/EC (Paris Convention Protocol Decision
2003), 2003 O.J. L 338/30.
121. Council Decision No. 2008/431/EC (Hague Convention Decision 2008), 2008
O.J. L 151/36; Council Decision No. 2003/93/EC (Hague Convention Decision 2003),
2003 O.J. L 48/1.
122. Rome I Regulation, supra note 15; Rome II Regulation, supra note 15.
123. Brussels II bis, supra note 17.
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certain procedure to follow if Member States intend to negotiate
such agreements.'24 It is remarkable that according to these
regulations, it is the Commission, and not the Council, that is
called upon to decide whether a Member State should be
authorized to conclude a given agreement.
Some of these Council decisions authorize Member States'
adherence "in the interest of the Community." The original
AETR/ERTA judgment of the Court provided that the Member
States could act "in the interest and on behalf of the
Community." 12 The more limited formula used in the recent
Council decisions ("in the interest of" the Union) raises the
question as to whether the decisions merely authorize Member
States to derogate from the rules concerning Union competence
or if they also imply a decision to make the conventions, or
certain provisions of them, part of the Union's legal order. 26
In a recent case, the Court noted the existence of a Council
decision to authorize the Member States to sign, ratify, or accede
to, in the interest of the Union, the 2003 supplementary protocol
to the Oil Pollution Fund Convention127 but refrained from
taking a stand on the legal effects of the Council decision, in view
of the fact that it could not apply rationae temporis to the facts at
issue in the main proceedings. 28
The mere fact that the Council has authorized one or more
Member States to adhere to an international instrument does not
suffice to make that instrument part of the Union legal order, as
the authorization does not necessarily entail a commitment on
behalf of the Union to become bound by the substantive rules to
which a Member States wishes to adhere.129 This observation
seems particularly relevant with respect to the general framework
124. See, e.g., Air Services Agreement Regulation, supra note 12; Contractual and
Non-contractual Obligations Regulation, supra note 14; supra notes 12, 14-17, and
accompanying text.
125. AETR-ERTA, Case C-22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 1 90 (emphasis added).
126. See RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 94, 124-25, 136-38.
127. Oil Pollution Fund Convention, supra note 94; Protocol to Amend the
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil
Pollution Damage, 2004 O.J. L 78/40.
128. Commune de Mesquer v. Total France, Case C-188/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4501,
86; see van Rossem, supra note 30, at 37.
129. See RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 137-39.
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regulations relating to air service agreements and agreements in
the area of international procedural law.130
On the other hand, it is arguable that a decision to
authorize all the Member States to adhere "in the interest of the
Union" creates a presumption of acceptance of the instrument as
part of the Union legal order, at least with respect to those
provisions of the instrument that belong to the area of the
Union's exclusive competence and are thus deemed to have
prompted Council authorization. This is particularly so if, as is
the case. with the Council authorizations mentioned above, they
are based on Article 218 TFEU, which concerns the conclusion of
agreements on behalf of the Union, and seem to imply, for the
Member States, not only an authorization but also an obligation
to adhere, or at least to seek to adhere, to the respective
convention.13 1
In this context, it is interesting to note that, on the basis of
Article 218(11) TFEU, the Court has considered admissible a
request for an opinion concerning an ILO convention that was
not open to EU adherence but that covered areas belonging to
Union competence.132 The Court, inter alia, referred to the fact
that while the ILO constitution prevented the EU from becoming
a contracting party, Union competence "may, if necessary, be
130. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
131. See RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 94, 125. It should be added, however, that the
timetable for Member States' adherence established in the relevant Council decisions is
not absolute. See Hague Convention Decision 2008, supra note 121, arts. 3-4, at 37;
Slovenia Decision, supra note 120, art. 2, at 24; Maritime Labour Convention Decision,
supra note 117, art. 2, at 64; Paris Convention Protocol Decision 2004, supra note 120,
art. 2, at 54; Oil Fund Convention Decision, supra note 21, art. 2, at 23; Paris Convention
Protocol Decision 2003, supra note 120, art. 2, at 31; Hague Convention Decision 2003,
supra note 121, art. 3, at 2; HNS Convention Decision, supra note 21, art. 3, at 56;
Bunkers Convention Decision, supra note 21, art. 3, at 8. As noted supra note 37, the
Member States, in their Statement on Maritime Safety of November 19, 2008, have taken
a "firm commitment" to adhere, no later thanJanuary 1, 2012 (and with respect to one
convention,January 1, 2013), to a number of maritime conventions.
132. Opinion on Convention No. 170 of the International Labour Organisation
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
1061, It 3-5; see also Stanislas Adam, Le contr6le par la Cour de justice de la
compatibilit6 avec les Trait6s d'un accord international envisag6 par l'Union
europdenne [Court ofJustice Conrol on the Compatibility of International Treaties with
the European Union] 379-81 (2010) (unpublished dissertation, defended on July 9,
2010 at the University of Ghent) (on file with author).
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exercised through the medium of the Member States acting
jointly in the Community interest." 33
Insofar as the Council authorization can be considered to
make the international agreement or some of its provisions part
of the Union legal order, this legal effect seems to be of an
internal nature only. The situation would resemble that of
agreements that are incorporated through Union legal acts by
virtue of an express renvoi. The Union would thus not become a
contracting party vis-A-vis third states, which cannot become
bound by a unilateral EU Council decision.'34 This, together with
the formula used by the Court in Opinion 1/91, may explain why
recent Council practice refers only to the "interest of' the
Community, omitting additional "on behalf of": the agreement
in question is not concluded on behalf of the Union vis-A-vis third
states. This should also imply that, as was considered above to be
the case for agreements incorporated into the Union legal order
through a renvoi, there will be no hierarchy between the
agreement and the secondary legislative act.
D. Agreements that Should Be Observed in the Application of Union
Law
There is another category of agreements concluded by EU
Member States that may play an important role in the application
of Union law without forming an integral part of the Union's
legal order, at least strictly speaking. These agreements do not
seem to be directly applicable (and hence seem to lack direct effect
as well) in Union law, implying that no right or obligation could
be based solely and directly on a provision of the agreement. A
lack of direct effect would probably also have as a consequence
that the validity of a Union legislative act could not be reviewed
on the sole basis of such agreements as according to settled case
law; such review presupposes that the agreement has direct
effect.'35 On the other hand, Union law seems to require that in
the application of this law, the agreement in question be observed
by the EU institutions and the Member States concerned.
133. Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061, 1 5.
134. See RINGBOM, supra note 21, at 137.
135. See supra note 111.
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The clearest examples are offered by the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") and other human
rights conventions.136 As the Court, in 1996, had ruled that the
Community lacked competence to become a contracting party to
the ECHR,'3 7 accession required a change of primary law (the
treaties). This has been accomplished with the Treaty of Lisbon,
which added a clause to Article 6 TEU stipulating that "the
Union shall accede" to the ECHR. Such accession has not yet
taken place. Independently of EU accession to the ECHR,
fundamental rights at the Union level are principally based on
two binding sources of law: the general principles of Union law
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ("Charter").13 8
The Court recognized as early as 1969 that the general
principles of Union law are the traditional source as far as
fundamental rights are concerned.""' Since the 1970s, the Court
has, in this context, made increasing use of the ECHR, holding
that it has "special significance" in the determination of the
general principles of Union law that are relevant from a
fundamental rights perspective, and since the mid-1990s, it has
cited individual judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights as part of its reasoning. 40
The Charter, made part of binding primary law by the
Treaty of Lisbon, makes numerous references to the ECHR as a
source of both inspiration and reference. Particularly important
is its Article 52(3), which provides that insofar as the Charter
contains rights "which correspond" to rights guaranteed by the
ECHR, "the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same
as those laid down by the said Convention."1 41 This does not
imply that the ECHR becomes directly applicable in the above
136. See KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 163; Schitze, supra note 30, at 399-402.
137. Opinion on Accession of the Community to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R.
1-1759.
138. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C 83/389
[hereinafter Charter of Rights].
139. See Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419.
140. See Allan Rosas, Fundamental Rights in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, in
THE EFTA COURT: TEN YEARS ON 163-75 (Carl Baudenbacher et al. eds., 2005); Allan
Rosas, The European Union and Fundamental Rights/Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 443, 457-59 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds.,
2009).
141. See Charter of Rights, supra note 138, art. 52(3), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 402.
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sense. The applicable rule in Union law is a given provision of
the Charter. This is also underscored by the fact that Article
52(3) of the Charter adds that the obligation to give the same
meaning and scope to the Charter provisions as to corresponding
provisions of the European Convention shall not prevent Union
law from providing more extensive protection.142
The status of the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its
protocol of 1967 relating to the status of refugees,143 although
less well-established, seems similar. This is because Article 78(1)
TFEU provides that the Union policy on asylum, subsidiary
protection, and temporary protection "must be in accordance
with" the Geneva Convention and Protocol and other relevant
treaties. Similar references to the Geneva Convention and
protocol are to be found in secondary law (directives) relating to
asylum policy.1
Regarding other human rights conventions, the Court has
held, since Nold v. Commission, that "guidelines" that should be
followed in the determination of fundamental rights as general
principles of Union law include "international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories." 145 This broad
formula could, in principle, include conventions to which not all
Member States are contracting parties, although the Court
usually cites only conventions that bind all Member States. 146
Human rights instruments other than the ones mentioned above
cited by the Court include the European Social Charter of
1961,147 the International Covenants of 1966,148 the Convention
142. For an example of such a situation, see Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie,
Case C-465/07, [2009] E.C.R. 1-921, 27-29.
143. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
144. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or
as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the
Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. L 304/12 (cited by Bolbol v. BevdndorlAsi 6s
Allampolgdrsdgi Hivatal, Case C-31/09, [2010] E.C.R. I_ (delivered June 17, 2010)
(not yet reported)).
145. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 13.
146. See Allan Rosas, The European Union and International Human Rights Instruments,
in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: DIscORD OR
HARMONY? 53-67 (Vincent Kronenberger ed., 2001).
147. European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
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on the Rights of the Child, 149 and even the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.o50
There is also an obligation, in principle, to observe the UN
Charter.'51 Article 3(5) TEU provides that the Union, in its
relations with the wider world, "shall contribute to, inter alia, the
strict observance and the development of international law,
including respect for the principles of the United Nations
Charter."15 2 A similar reference to the Charter is to be found in
Article 21 TEU.
On the other hand, the status in Union law of sanctions
decided by the Security Council has become a contentious issue
in the context of sanctions adopted against alleged terrorists. In
Yusuf and Kadi, the then Court of First Instance (now the
General Court) held that certain parts of the UN Charter are also
binding on the Community. This led the Court of First Instance
to decline judicial review of EU sanctions implementing binding
UN sanctions (with the exception of controlling whether the UN
sanctions infringed jus cogens or peremptory international law). 153
This conclusion was overturned by the Court, which
annulled the EU Council regulation in question on the grounds
that it violated the appellants' right to an effective judicial
remedy as well as their property rights.154 In this context, the
Court refrained from declaring that the UN Charter is directly
binding on the EU. The Court did observe, on the other hand,
that its previous ruling, according to which the powers of the
Union in the sphere of development cooperation must be
exercised "in observance of the undertakings given in the
148. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
149. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
150. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); see Allan Rosas, The European Union: In Search of
Legitimacy, in 60 YEARS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE
415-31 (Vinodh Jaichand & Markku Suksi eds., 2009).
151. See generally KLABBERS, supra note 30, at 151-63; Schfitze, supra note 30, at
402-06.
152. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, 2010 0.J. C 83, at 17.
153. SeeYusuf v. Commission, Case T-306/01, [2003] E.C.R. 11-3533, 1 245-59; see
also Kadi v. Council, Case T-315/01, [2003] E.C.R. 11-3649.
154. See Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council, Joined Cases C-402, 415/05 P,
[2008] E.C.R. 1-6351.
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context of the United Nations," applied also to the sphere of the
maintenance of international peace and security and that in
drawing up sanction-implementing measures, the Union "is to
take due account of the terms and objectives of the resolution
concerned and of the relevant obligations under the Charter of
the United Nations relating to such implementation." 55
It would seem that these dicta are based on the idea that
while the UN Charter is not an integral part of the Union's legal
order stricto sensu, there is a general obligation to observe, in
principle, the UN Charter in the application and interpretation
of Union law. It is another question that the Court refused to
grant immunity from judicial review, holding that if the UN
Charter obligations were to be classified in the hierarchy of
Union norms, they would have to yield to Union primary law, in
particular to fundamental rights (as primary law, in the EU
constitutional order, prevails over international agreements
binding on the Union, while international agreements, in turn,
prevail over Union secondary law).156
In Intertanko, the Court held that Marpol 1973/78 should be
taken into account in the interpretation of an EU directive,
despite the fact that the convention is not directly binding on the
EU and that the validity of the directive could not be reviewed in
light of the convention.157 The directive in question also
contained references to Marpol that may fall short of a renvoi in
the strict sense but which make observance of certain provisions
of Marpol a condition for considering that a discharge of
polluting substances does not constitute an infringement of the
directive.158
Many other legislative acts in the maritime field contain
similar references to international maritime conventions to
which the EU has not adhered.5 9 To cite but two additional
examples, a 2009 directive relating to port state control instructs
the Member States, if the gross tonnage of a ship is less than 500,
to "apply those requirements of a relevant Convention which are
155. Id. 292-93, 296.
156. See id. 11 305-09. On the hierarchy of norms in Union law, see ROSAS &
ARMATI, supra note 2, at 41-53; see also supra text accompanying note 24.
157. See Intertanko, Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057.
158. See Ship-Source Pollution Directive, supra note 112, art. 5, at 13.
159. See generally RINGBOM, supra note 21.
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applicable," 60 while a directive relating to the insurance of ship
owners for maritime claims provides that the amount of the
insurance for each and every ship per incident "shall be equal to
the relevant maximum amount for the limitation of liability as
laid down in the 1996 Convention."1 61
E. Agreements that Should Be Taken into Account in the
Interpretation of Union Law
In Intertanko, at issue was the legality of an EU directive on
ship-source pollution16 2 in light of Marpol 73/78 and the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. As already noted above, the
Court held that it could not review the legality of the directive in
light of these two instruments as the UN convention lacked direct
effect and as Marpol was not binding upon the Union. True, the
directive made references to Marpol and some of its provisions
even incorporated certain provisions of Marpol. But the Court
held that the mere fact that the Directive had the objective of
incorporating certain rules set out in Marpol was not sufficient
for it to compel the Court to review the directive's legality in the
light of the convention. 163
In accordance with what was stated above,164 it is another
matter that if a provision in an EU directive incorporates
provisions of an international agreement (in other words, uses
the legislative technique of a renvoi instead of simply repeating
the full text of the agreement in the text of the directive), that
part of the agreement (or to more precise, that part of the text of
the agreement) should be applied in the Union legal order. As
for the other parts, the Court, in Intertanko, added a requirement
concerning Marpol, given the fact that all Member States were
contracting parties and that the EU directive contained
160. Parliament and Council Directive 2009/16/EC on Port State Control, art.
3(2), 2009 O.J. L 131/57, at 62. Article 2 of the directive lists a number of conventions,
including their protocols, concluded by the Member States, which are included in the
notion of "conventions." Id. art. 2, at 61-62.
161. Parliament and Council Directive 2009/20/EC on the Insurance of
Shipowners for Maritime Claims, art. 4(3), 2009 O.J. L 131/128, at 129. "Convention of
1996" refers to the Oil Pollution Liability Convention, supra note 94.
162. Ship-Source Pollution Directive, supra note 112.
163. See Intertanko, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 50; see also van Rossem, supra note 30,
passim.
164. See supra Part IV.B.
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references to Marpol. According to the Court, the customary
principle of good faith, as well as the principle of loyal
cooperation expressed in Article 10 of the EC Treaty (now
Article 4(3) TEU), made it incumbent upon the Court to
interpret the provisions of the relevant directive "taking account
of Marpol 73/78."165
It is submitted that this dictum does not imply that Marpol
in its entirety has become part of the Union legal order. The
Convention is, in other words, not directly applicable and the
requirement to take account of Marpol does not amount to a
requirement of consistent interpretation (interpr6tation conforme)
in the strict sense applying to directives and international
agreements binding upon the Union. 166 That said, "taking
account of' may, in concrete situations, be difficult to distinguish
from consistent interpretation stricto sensu.
The requirement of "taking account of" was not repeated in
Commune de Mesquer, which concerned the interpretation of an
EU directive relating to waste.167 As the waste in question, which
consisted of heavy fuel oil accidentally spilled at sea following the
shipwreck of the tanker Erika, mixed with water and sediment
and washed up on the coast of France, the question arose as to
the relevance of the Oil Pollution Liability Convention and the
Oil Pollution Fund Convention, both of which are binding upon
most EU Member States but not on the Union itself. As was
already noted above, a Council decision authorizing the Member
States to conclude the Supplementary Protocol of 2003 to the
Fund Convention168 was not relevant as it was not applicable
rationae temporis.69 The Court limited itself to observing that the
Union was not bound by the two conventions, without any
reference to the dictum in Intertanko.170
165. See Intertanko, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057, 52.
166. On the principle of consistent interpretation (which, while not authorizing an
interpretation contra legem, may nevertheless require an interpretation praeter legem) see,
e.g., ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 2, at 59-63.
167. See Directive 75/442/EEC on Waste, 1975 O.J. L 194/39; see also Commune de
Mesquer v. Total France, Case C-188/07, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4501.
168. Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, 2004 O.J. L
78/32.
169. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
170. See Intertanko, Case C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-4057, 1 52.
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Why did the Court not state that the conventions should at
least be taken into account in the interpretation of the waste
directive? Two differences as compared to the situation in
Intertanko come to mind: first, not all Member States were parties
to the Oil Pollution Liability and Fund Conventions (a fact
mentioned in the Court's judgmentl7 ) and, second, the waste
directive contained no references to these or any other
international conventions. In such a situation, the international
agreements remain part of the national law of the Member States
that are bound by them, and these agreements will have no direct
relevance in the Union legal order (assuming that the
agreements have been concluded by Member States after they
became EU members).
F. Agreements that Authorize Member States to Apply an Agreement
Instead of EU Law
Finally, it will be recalled that Union secondary law
sometimes allows a derogation from the principle of primacy of
Union law by authorizing Member States to apply, instead of
Union law, an international agreement they concluded. One can
then speak of a legislative extension of the principle contained in
Article 351(1) TFEU considered above.172 In this case, the
agreement does not enter into the Union legal order, and it is
doubtful whether Union law should be interpreted in light of the
agreement in question.
Some examples of such rules of derogation in Union law
were already given above. They include provisions in the Brussels
I Regulation (relating to jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters),173
and regulations on the law applicable to contractual and non-
contractual obligations (Rome I and Rome II).174 In this context,
it can also be recalled that a directive on environmental liability
171. See Commune de Mesquer, [20081 E.C.R. 1-4501, 1[ 85. But in a Statement on
Maritime Safety of November 19, 2008, supra note 37, at 2, the EU Member States have
made a commitment to express, no later than January 1, 2012, their consent to be
bound by these conventions.
172. See Part III; see also Schatze, supra note 30, at 437.
173. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 55, art. 71, at 16.
174. See Rome I Regulation, supra note 15, art. 25, at 15-16; see also Rome II
Regulation, supra note 15, art. 28, at 47.
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excludes from its field of application environmental damage
arising from an incident in respect of which liability or
compensation falls within the scope of any of the international
liability convention listed in an annex to the directive. 75
Reference was also already made above to a recentjudgment
of the Court in which the Court, in the context of the Brussels I
Regulation No. 44/2001, held that the application of specialized
conventions binding on Member States cannot compromise the
principles that underlie the relevant area of Union law and that
therefore their application is subject to certain conditions.176 The
scope and intensity of this caveat will probably depend on the
specific nature of the relevant EU legislative act and on the
wording and context of the provision referring to the continued
relevance of agreements concluded by the Member States.
CONCLUSION
While the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty17 7 and
developments in case law 78 have further diminished the scope
for agreements to be concluded by EU Member States rather
than by the Union, such agreements will continue to exist and
require legal analysis from an EU law perspective. Even if these
agreements have not been concluded by the EU itself, they may
in different ways have to be taken into account in the Union legal
order. The conclusions reached above may be summed up as
follows:
175. See Environmental Liability Directive, supra note 41, art. 4, at 61; see also supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
176. See TNT Express Nederland v. AXA Versicherung, Case C-533/08, [2010]
E.C.R. I (delivered May 4, 2010) (not yet reported), 1 49.
177. See notably Article 207 TFEU, supra note 6, which for the first time includes
trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, and foreign direct
investment fully in the common commercial policy, listed in Article 3 TFEU among the
areas of Union exclusive competence; and Article 216 TFEU, which broadens the scope
for a (potential) Union competence to conclude international agreement, as compared
with Article 300(1) of the EC Treaty, supra note 5.
178. On a fairly broad interpretation of the AETR-ERTA principle, according to
which the Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of all agreements
that "may affect" common Union rules or alter their scope, see notably Opinion on
Competence of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Opinion 1/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-1145 and Commission v. Greece, Case C-45/07, [2009]
E.C.R. 1-701; Commission v. Sweden, Case C-468/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9575; and the other
"Open Skies" judgments mentioned supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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1. An agreement concluded by Member States may in
certain exceptional situations become binding on the Union by
way of succession, with legal effects also for third states (GATT
1947 being the only example accepted so far in case law). This
situation is exceptional.
2. An agreement concluded by Member States may become
incorporated into the Union legal order either through
references in Union law (renvoi) or through a Council decision
authorizing the Member States to conclude an agreement in the
interest of the Union. Each case has to be analyzed on its own
merits; a Council decision to authorize Member States to
conclude an agreement does not necessarily amount to such
incorporation. The mere fact that a provision of an agreement
concluded by Member States becomes directly applicable in the
Union legal order does not entail legal effects for third states nor
does it seem to put the agreement above Union legislation in the
hierarchy of Union norms.
3. An agreement concluded by Member States may, without
becoming directly applicable, enjoy binding effect in the sense
that it has to be observed in the application of Union law. This
category seems particularly relevant with respect to human rights
conventions, notably the ECHR, at least parts of the UN Charter,
and to some extent, certain maritime conventions.
4. An agreement concluded by all Member States and
mentioned in Union legislation may have to be "taken into
account" in the interpretation of Union law, even if the
reference to the agreement does not amount to full
incorporation in accordance with point two above.
5. Any agreement concluded by Member States prior to EU
membership may enable the Member States concerned to invoke
the agreement, by way of derogation from the principle of
primacy of Union law (Article 351(1) TFEU). Article 351(1)
TFEU may not be invoked for an agreement that derogates from
the core principles of the Union constitutional order nor is the
provision applicable to agreements concluded solely by the
Member States inter se. A violation of Article 351(2) TFEU
(obligation to take all appropriate steps to eliminate
incompatibilities between prior agreements and Union law) may
at some point deprive the Member State concerned of the right
to invoke Article 351(1).
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6. Union legal acts may in some cases provide for an
extension of the principle contained in Article 351(1) TFEU to
special agreements concluded by Member States after they have
become members of the EU. Such examples are to be found,
inter alia, in the field of private international law (such as the
Brussels I and Rome I and II regulations).
7. Other agreements concluded by Member States are part
of their national law only and their relevance from a Union law
perspective does not go beyond the possible relevance for Union
law of their national legal orders in general.
As can be seen from this list, international agreements
concluded by EU Member States but not by the Union itself raise
a number of issues that cannot be squeezed into a single
category. The situation is quite complex and points to different
degrees of normative status under Union law. This Essay has
brought out at least six categories of such agreements, the
normative status of which goes beyond the status of the national
law of the Member States in general. No doubt additional
categories or sub-categories can be found. The subject certainly
merits further analysis and discussion.
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